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Abstract
We address the question of whether schools can manipulate the student-optimal stable
mechanism by creating fictitious students in school choice problems. To this end, we intro-
duce two different manipulation concepts, where one of them is stronger. We first demon-
strate that the student-optimal stable mechanism is not even weakly fictitious student-proof
under general priority structures. Then, we investigate the same question under acyclic pri-
ority structures. We prove that, while the student-optimal stable mechanism is not strongly
fictitious student-proof even under the acyclicity condition, weak fictitious student-proofness
is achieved under acyclicity. This paper, hence, shows a way to avoid the welfare detrimental
fictitious students creation (in the weak sense) in terms of priority structures.
JEL classification: C71, C78, D71, D78, J44.




Several states in the U.S. have been using centralized school choice programs for the
problem of assigning students to schools. Initiated by Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003),
the use of mechanism design theory has proved useful for this kind of problems. In a school
choice problem, each student has a preference ranking over schools and being unassigned,
and schools have priority orders over students, which are determined according to certain
criteria imposed by law such as the proximity of students’ residences to schools, which
schools students’ siblings are attending (if applicable), etc. As well as the priority orders,
each school has a capacity limiting the maximum number of students it can be assigned to.
At a matching, each student is assigned at most one school, and each school is assigned to
as many students as at most its capacity. A matching is stable if no student prefers being
unmatched to his assignment, and there is no student-school pair such that each of them
prefers each other to their respective assignments. Besides its theoretical appeal, empirical
studies have shown that stable solutions often succeed, whereas unstable ones often fail.
Fortunately, Gale and Shapley (1962) show the existence of a stable solution in match-
ing markets and introduce the celebrated deferred acceptance algorithm for finding one.
This positive result, however, has not solved all the problems of matching design, especially
regarding the strategic ones. Roth (1982) shows that no stable mechanism is immune to
preference manipulations. However, if the preferences of one side are common knowledge,
as in the school choice context (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003)), the student-optimal
stable mechanism is strategy-proof and stable (Dubins and Freedman (1981), Roth (1982)).
As well as preference manipulations, So¨nmez (1997, 1999) show that no stable mechanism
is immune to capacity and pre-arrangement manipulations, respectively. Some recent re-
lated papers on manipulation incentives in matching markets include Ehlers (2010), Kojima
(2011), Kojima and Pathak (2009), Afacan (2010, 2011), and Kesten (2010).
In the current study, we investigate another channel via which schools could manipulate
matching mechanisms. In Yokoo et al. (2004), false-bid manipulation incentives are studied in
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combinatorial auctions. In this kind of manipulations, a bidder tries to profit from submitting
false bids under a fictitious name. On the other hand, as a corresponding manipulation in
the school choice setting, one can think of a situation where schools create fictitious students
in the hope of getting better assignments. This raises the question of whether schools can
manipulate matching mechanisms via creating such students. In order to address it in the
paper, first, we introduce two different manipulation notions. In the first (strong) one,
schools encounter two natural constraints in creating fictitious students: they can not affect
the preference profile of “non-fictitious” students and the priority rankings of schools among
them. In addition to these constraints, for the weak one, we also add the one that fictitious
students have to be either unassigned or matched with the school which created them.
Then, unfortunately, it turns out that the student-optimal stable mechanism is not even
weakly fictitious student-proof. We, next, investigate the manipulation incentives under
acyclic priority structures (Ergin (2002)). To this end, we impose the restriction on the
manipulation concepts that no cycle (in the sense of Ergin (2002)) can exist in the priority
structure of schools. We, then, show that the student-optimal stable mechanism is weakly
fictitious student-proof under acyclicity, while it is not in the strong sense even under the
acyclicity imposition.
Our analysis shows that one can not eliminate the fictitious students creation incentives
(in the strong sense) of schools even under the acyclicity condition. However, for some
reasons, if it is not in a school’s interest to create such students where some of them get
matched with another school,1 then our paper suggests the social planner to influence the
priority structure of schools to make it acyclic in order to eliminate the fictitious students
creation incentives.
Do schools manipulate matching mechanisms through creating fictitious students in the
real-world? While we do not have certain evidence necessarily showing the presence of such
students created by schools in the hope of getting better assignments in the school choice
1This might be due to some policy or the presence of externalities. The reader could refer to Footnotes
9&10 for detailed explanations.
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context, there are at least two suggestive real-life facts. First, it was documented that some
for-profit schools committed fraud through urging applicants to manipulate their information
or creating fictitious students to receive more federal aid.2 Hence, even though not being
a perfect match to our model in terms of real-world application, this at least suggests that
schools might create fictitious students to get better assignments in the centralized school
choice programs as well, where they only care about their matchings. Secondly, in the case
of presence of such students, naturally, they have to be among the ones who are either
unassigned or assigned but withdraw from their seats.3 This does not contradict the fact
that, in each year, there are many such students in the real-world school choice programs.4
Hence, given these suggestive facts, one can not claim the non-existence of fictitious students
without certain evidence.
Why should we care about this type of manipulations? From the well-known comparative
statistics result in Gale and Sotomayor (1985), we know that, under the student-optimal
stable mechanism, the presence of fictitious students leads non-fictitious ones to be at least
weakly worse off, and in the case of a successful manipulation, at least one of them is strictly
worse off. This means that a successful manipulation through creating fictitious students
results in a Pareto inferior outcome to the one that would otherwise arise.5 Hence, at least
this suggests the benevolent social planner to take this kind of manipulation possibilities
into account in matching design.
Why do we focus on the student-optimal stable mechanism? There are two important
reasons for it. First, the student-optimal stable mechanism has appealing properties such as
2One might refer to the article on The Washington Post at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/08/03/AR2010080303846.html, or the report by United States General Account-
ing Office at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03268r.pdf. Besides these, here is a quotation document-
ing the existence of fictitious students from Orlando for-profit school fraud lawyers (http://www.gregory-
clark.com/For-profit-Schools): “Actual fraud is committed when for-profit schools invent fictitious students,
getting loans on their behalf, which will never be repaid”.
3By “withdraw”, we also mean the students who eventually do not show up in their assigned schools.
4For instance, in the New York City high school placements for the academic year 2003-2004, over 90, 000
students, approximately 3, 000 of them did not get any school they chose, and approximately 8, 000 students
withdrew from the New York City Public Schools (Abdulkadirogˇlu et al. (2005)).
5Since schools are considered as objects to be consumed in the school choice problems, only the welfare
of students matters (in our setting, naturally, only the welfare of non-fictitious ones is considered).
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stability, strategy-proofness and being the efficient one among all other stable mechanisms.
Secondly, it has been widely adopted in the United States: New York City (which has the
largest public school system in the country with over a million students) and Boston (which
has over 60, 000 students enrolled in the public school system) school districts have been
using the student-optimal stable mechanism (Abdulkadirogˇlu et al. (2005) and Roth et al.
(2005)).
2 Related Literature
The current study is related to the extensive literature on incentive theory in matching
markets. In two-sided matching markets, while Roth (1982) shows that no stable mechanism
is strategy-proof,6 Kojima and Pathak (2009) prove that, under certain regularity conditions,
the scope of preference manipulations diminishes when the market becomes large. On the
other hand, if one side of the market has commonly known preferences, there exists a strategy-
proof stable mechanism (Dubins and Freedman (1981),Roth (1982)). As well as preference
manipulations, So¨nmez (1997, 1999) prove that no stable mechanism is non-manipulable via
capacities and pre-arrangements respectively; and, similarly, Afacan (2011) shows that no
stable mechanism is immune to application fee manipulations.
The acyclicity condition (Ergin (2002)) proves critical in the current paper. There are
other related studies in the literature sharing this point. Ergin (2002) shows that the student-
optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof7 under acyclic priority structures. Kojima
(2011) proposes the robust stability notion and shows that the student-optimal stable mech-
anism is robustly stable if and only if the priority structure of schools is acyclic; Afacan
(2010) extends this result to the group robust stability notion; and Kesten (2010) demon-
strates that acyclicity is necessary and sufficient for the student-optimal stable mechanism
to be immune to capacity manipulations. The current paper identifies one more sense in
6A mechanism is strategy-proof if no agent ever benefits from misreporting his preference.
7A mechanism is group strategy-proof if no group of agents ever has an incentive to misreport their
preferences.
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which such a structure proves critical for the design of matching markets by showing that
the student-optimal stable mechanism is weakly fictitious student-proof under acyclicity.
Another related paper from the auction theory literature is Yokoo et al. (2004) where
the authors examine the incentives of bidders to submit bids under fictitious names in com-
binatorial auctions. They say that an auction protocol is false-name-proof if no bidder can
profitably submit a false name bid in any problem instance. They first show that no effi-
cient auction protocol is false-name-proof then give a sufficient condition which makes VCG
mechanism false-name-proof. Regarding the connection between that paper and the current
study, one can interpret the introduced manipulation notions and the results in the paper as
the corresponding ones to those in Yokoo et al. (2004) in the matching market environment.
3 Model & Results
A school choice problem consists of a tuple (S,C, P,, q). The first two components
are finite and disjoint sets of students and schools, respectively. Each student s ∈ S has a
preference relation Ps, which is a complete, strict, and transitive binary relation over the set
of schools C and being unassigned (denoted by ∅). Let P be the set of all such preference
relations, and the list P = (Ps)s∈S is the preference profile of students. We write cRsc′ if
either cPsc
′ or c = c′. Each school c ∈ C has a priority order c, which is a complete,
strict, and transitive binary relation over the set of students S.8 We write = (c)c∈C for
the priority order profile of schools. As well as the priority orders, q = (qc)c∈C is the quota
profile of schools where qc is of school c. We call the tuple (, q) priority structure.
8Since we are primarily interested in the school choice problem, we assume that every student is acceptable
to every school.
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We interpret the priority orders of schools as their preferences and extend them to over
the set of groups of students in the responsive (Roth (1985)) way. Then, the choice of a
school c ∈ C from a group of students J ⊆ S under the priority order c and quota qc is
defined as
Chc(c, qc, J) = {J ′ ⊆ J : |J ′| ≤ qc, J ′ c J ′′ for all J ′′ ⊆ J such that |J ′′| ≤ qc}.
A matching µ is an assignment of students to schools such that no student is assigned
more than one school, and no school is assigned to more students than its quota. We write
µi for the assignment of agent i ∈ S ∪ C under µ. A matching µ is individually rational if
µsRs∅ for all s ∈ S. Matching µ is blocked by a student-school pair (s, c) ∈ S × C if cPsµs
and s c s′ for some s′ ∈ µc. A matching µ is stable if it is individually rational and is not
blocked by any pair (s, c) ∈ S × C.
As the priority orders of schools are exogenously given, thereby publicly known, we refer
to a tuple (S,C,, q) as a market and consider only the students’ preferences privately
known information. A mechanism ψ is a function from P |S| to the set of all matchings.
Mechanism ψ is stable if ψ(P ) is stable for every preference profile P ∈ P |S|.
Before proceeding with the rest of the paper, we outline the deferred acceptance algorithm
(Gale and Shapley (1962)) producing the student-optimal stable matching ψA(P ) for every
P ∈ P |S|.
Step 1. Each student applies to his first choice school. Each school that receives one or
more offers holds as many best acceptable offers as at most its quota and rejects the rest.
In general,
Step t. Each student who was rejected in step (t − 1) applies to his best acceptable
choice in the set of schools to which he did not apply before. Each school holds as many
best acceptable offers as at most its quota among the set of offers held at step (t − 1) and
the offers it receives at this step and rejects the rest.
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The algorithm terminates when no student applies to a school, and the tentatively held
offers at the termination step are realized as assignments. The student-optimal stable mech-
anism produces ψA(P ) for all P ∈ P |S|, and, thereafter, it is denoted by ψA.
In what follows, we analyze the fictitious students creation incentives first under general
priority structures then under acyclic ones.
3.1 General Priority Structures
Definition 1. Mechanism ψ is weakly manipulable via creating fictitious students at a match-
ing problem instance (S,C, P,, q) if there exist a school c ∈ C and another matching problem
instance (S ′, C, P ′,′, q) such that the followings satisfy:
(i) S ⊂ S ′,
(ii) for all s, s′ ∈ S and c ∈ C, s c s′ if and only if s ′c s′,
(iii) P ′s = Ps for all s ∈ S,
(iv) ψc(S
′, C, P ′,′, q) ∩ S c ψc(S,C, P,, q).
In words, we refer to the students in S ′\S as fictitious students and say that a mechanism
is weakly manipulable via creating fictitious students at a problem if a school can be strictly
better off by creating such students under the constraints that it can affect neither the priority
rankings of schools among non-fictitious students (Condition (ii)) nor the preference profile
of them (Condition (iii)).
Remark 1. In the definition, manipulating school c compares the outcomes based on
its non-fictitious students assignments (i.e, according to c rather than ′c). This is very
natural, since it knows that all students in the set S ′ \ S are fictitious created by itself.
Definition 2. A mechanism ψ is strongly fictitious student-proof if it is not weakly manip-
ulable via creating fictitious students at any matching problem instance (S,C, P,, q).
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Theorem 1. ψA is not strongly fictitious student-proof.
Proof. Consider a problem consisting of S = {i}, C = {a, b}, qa = qb = 1, and the following
preference relation of student i:
Pi : a, b, ∅
Since there is only one student, no need to write the priority orders of schools explicitly.
Then, ψAi (Pi) = a. Now, let school b create a fictitious student j. Moreover, assume that
the preference relation of him Pj, and the priority rankings of schools ′ over {i, j} are as
follows:
Pj : a, b, ∅,
′a: j, i ; ′b: j, i.
Let P = (Pi, Pj). Then, ψ
A(P ) = (ψAi (P ), ψ
A
j (P )) = (b, a). Hence, school b is better off,
which completes the proof.
Given the above negative result, we weaken the manipulation concept and investigate
whether the student-optimal stable mechanism is manipulable via creating fictitious students
in this weak sense.
Definition 3. Mechanism ψ is strongly manipulable via creating fictitious students at a
matching problem instance (S,C, P,, q) if there exist a school c ∈ C and another matching
problem instance (S ′, C, P ′,′, q) such that the followings satisfy:
(i) S ⊂ S ′,
(ii) for all s, s′ ∈ S and c ∈ C, s c s′ if and only if s ′c s′,
(iii) P ′s = Ps for all s ∈ S,
(iv) for all s ∈ S ′ \ S, either ψs(S ′, C, P ′,′, q) = c or ψs(S ′, C, P ′,′, q) = ∅,
(v) ψc(S
′, C, P ′,′, q) ∩ S c ψc(S,C, P,, q).
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The only difference between the two manipulation concepts is Condition (iv) in the
above definition. Namely, it imposes the restriction that fictitious students have to be either
unassigned or assigned the school which created them. This condition, which we interpret
as capturing the situations where it is not in a school’s interest to create such students
where some of them get matched with another school, can realize in the real-life matching
markets in the presence of some policy9 or externalities10 (even though we do not consider
externalities in the paper).
Definition 4. A mechanism ψ is weakly fictitious student-proof if it is not strongly manip-
ulable via creating fictitious students at any matching problem instance (S,C, P,, q).
Unfortunately, it turns out that the student-optimal stable mechanism is not even weakly
fictitious student-proof.
Theorem 2. ψA is not weakly fictitious student-proof.
Proof. Consider a matching problem instance consisting of S = {i, j}, C = {a, b}, qa = qb =
1, the following preference and priority order profiles:
Pi : b, a, ∅,
Pj : a, b, ∅,
a: i, j,
b: j, i.
Let P = (Pi, Pj), then ψ
A(P ) = (ψAi (P ), ψ
A
j (P )) = (b, a). Now, let school b create a
fictitious student, say k; and assume that the preference profile of him Pk and the priority
rankings of schools ′ over {i, j, k} are as follows:
9One such policy might impose high penalties, in the case where a school reports that one of its assigned
students withdrew from his seat, on all schools except the reporting one.
10One kind of such externalities might correspond to the case where each school prefers other schools to
be matched with their better options. Under the weak manipulation case (Definition 1), a manipulating
school might cause all other schools to be strictly worse-off (see the example given in the proof of Theorem
1: since student j is fictitious there, at the end, school a would end up with no student which is strictly
worse outcome than what would otherwise arise). Whereas, by the well-known comparative statistics result
(Gale and Sotomayor (1985)), whenever a school manipulates the student-optimal stable mechanism through
creating fictitious students in the strong sense (Definition 3), then all schools would be at least weakly better
off while at least one of them would be strictly better off as well as the manipulating one.
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Pk : a, ∅, b,
′a: i, k, j,
′b: j, i, k.
Let P ′ = (Pi, Pj, Pk). Then, ψA(P ′) = (ψAi (P
′), ψAj (P
′), ψAk (P
′)) = (a, b, ∅) (note that all
the conditions in the manipulation definition are met). Hence, school b is better off through
creating fictitious student k, which finishes the proof.
3.2 Acyclic Priority Structures
The following acyclic priority structure notion, which will be critical in the rest of the
paper, is due to Ergin (2002).
Definition 5 (Ergin (2002)). Given a priority structure (, q), a cycle is a, b ∈ C, i, j, k ∈ S
such that;
(i) i a j a k and k b i, and
(ii) there exist (possibly empty) disjoint sets of students Sa, Sb ⊂ S \ {i, j, k} such that
|Sa| = qa − 1, |Sb| = qb − 1, s a j for every s ∈ Sa, and s b i for every s ∈ Sb.
A priority structure (, q) is acyclic if there exists no cycle.
As we pointed out in the related literature section, the student-optimal stable mechanism
admits many appealing properties under acyclic priority structures. Given this fact, in the
rest of the paper, we investigate whether it is also true for the fictitious students creation
incentives if the social planner arranges the priority structure of schools in a way that makes
it acyclic.
Definition 6. Mechanism ψ is weakly (strongly) manipulable via creating fictitious students
under acyclicity at a matching problem instance (S,C, P,, q) if there exist a school c ∈ C
and another matching problem instance (S ′, C, P ′,′, q) such that (i) all the conditions in
Definition 1 (Definition 3) are met, and (ii) (′, q) is acyclic.
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Definition 7. A mechanism ψ is strongly (weakly) fictitious student-proof under acyclicity
if it is not weakly (strongly) manipulable via creating fictitious students under acyclicity at
any matching problem instance (S,C, P,, q).
Unfortunately, given that the priority structure (′, q) in the proof of Theorem 1 is
acyclic, it turns out that the student-optimal stable mechanism is not strongly fictitious
student-proof even under acyclicity.
Theorem 3. ψA is not strongly fictitious student-proof under acyclicity.
However, in the following, we obtain weak fictitious student-proofness with the help of
acyclicity.
Theorem 4. ψA is weakly fictitious student-proof under acyclicity.
Proof. See Appendix.
Given that the priority structure (′, q) in the proof of Theorem 2 is not acyclic, we obtain
a necessary and sufficient condition in terms of priority structures in the sense that there is
a problem instance where a school can succeed in manipulation through creating fictitious
students in the absence of the acyclicity imposition, whereas it is otherwise impossible as the
above theorem shows. Therefore, similar to the extant literature, the acyclicity condition
turns out to be critical in obtaining the positive result in the paper. The current study,
hence, identifies one more reason for the benevolent social planner to influence the priority
structure of schools to make it acyclic.
Remark 2. In the manipulation notions, we assume that the priority rankings of fic-
titious students in schools can be arranged in any way (unless a cycle is created in the
associated section of the paper) by the school which created them. However, as we pointed
out in the introduction part, the priority orders of schools are determined exogenously ac-
cording to certain criteria imposed by law. This implies that they might not be totally
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independent across schools in the real-world problems.11 Yet, while we need this assumption
in order to make analysis possible, our results would not be affected by the absence of it. It
is clear that manipulation through creating fictitious students would be harder without it,
which implies that acyclicity would be still sufficient for the student-optimal stable mech-
anism to be weakly fictitious student-proof. On the other hand, since all the examples for
the negative results given in the paper would also work,12 the necessity of acyclicity would
be still valid as well.
4 TTC
In this section, we investigate the vulnerability of TTC to fictitious students creations.
Proposition 1. TTC is not strongly fictitious student-proof.
Proof. The example given in the proof of Theorem 1 shows this result.
Theorem 5. TTC is not weakly fictitious student-proof.
Proof. Let C = {c1, c2, c3} and S = {s1, s2, s3} with qc1 = 2 and qc2 = qc3 = 1.
c1 : s2, s1...; c2 : s3...,; c3 : s1...
Ps1 : c2, c1...;
Ps2 : c2, c3...;
Ps3 : c3, ...;
TTC =
 s1 s2 s3
c2 ∅ c3

11For example, think of a situation where the manipulating school wants a fictitious student to be at the
top of the priority order of school a while at the bottom in that of school b. This, however, might not be
possible if the qualifications of the fictitious student, which make him top at the priority order of school a,
also put his name in a high position in that of school b as well.
12Basically, in the examples, the relevant underlyings of schools might enable the manipulating schools to
arrange the priority orders as in the proofs even without our assumption.
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Let school c1 create fictitious student x with Px : c1... The following is the new priority
profile of schools:
c1 : s2, s1, x..; c2 : x, s3..; c3 : x, s1.
TTC ′ =
 s1 s2 s3 x
c1 c2 c3 c1

5 Conclusion
We address the question of whether schools can manipulate the student-optimal stable
mechanism via creating fictitious students. To this end, we introduce two different manipu-
lation notions, where one of them is stronger. We first demonstrate that the student-optimal
stable mechanism is not even weakly fictitious student-proof. Next, we impose the acyclicity
condition and show that the student-optimal stable mechanism is weakly fictitious student-
proof under acyclicity, while it is not in the strong sense.
Appendix
A mechanism ψ is group strategy-proof if there are no group of students A ⊆ S and a
false preference profile for them P ′A such that ψi(P
′
A, P−A)Riψi(P ) for all i ∈ A, and it holds
strictly for at least one student in A.
Mechanism ψ is efficient if there is no matching µ such that µiRiψi(P ) for all i ∈ S, and
it holds strictly for at least one student.
The following definitions are due to Kojima and Manea (2010).
A preference profile R′i is individually rational monotonic transformation of Ri at c ∈
C ∪ {∅} (R′i i.r.m.t Ri at c) if c′R′ic and c′R′i∅ ⇒ c′Ric for all c′ ∈ C; and R′ i.r.m.t R at a
matching µ if R′i i.r.m.t Ri at µi for all i ∈ S.
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A mechanism ψ satisfies individually rational monotonicity if R′ i.r.m.t R at ψ(R), then
ψi(R
′)R′iψi(R) for all i ∈ S.
Proof. We prove by contradiction. Let assume that ψA is not weakly fictitious student-
proof under acyclicity. Then, this implies that there exist a school c, and matching problem
instances (S,C, P,, q) and (S ′, C, P ′,′, q) such that (i) (′, q) is acyclic, and (ii) the
following conditions satisfy:
(i) S ⊂ S ′,
(ii) for all s, s′ ∈ S and c ∈ C, s c s′ if and only if s ′c s′,
(iii) P ′s = Ps for all s ∈ S,
(iv) for all s ∈ S ′ \ S, either ψAs (S ′, C, P ′,′, q) = c or ψAs (S ′, C, P ′,′, q) = ∅,
(v) ψAc (S
′, C, P ′,′, q) ∩ S c ψAc (S,C, P,, q).




i (S,C, P,, q), ψAi (S ′, C, P ′,′, q), ∅ if i ∈ S
ψAi (S
′, C, P ′,′, q), ∅ otherwise
Let P ′′ = (P ′′i )i∈S′ . Then, we claim that ψ
A
i (S
′, C, P ′′,′, q)R′iψAi (S ′, C, P ′,′, q) for all
i ∈ S ′, and for at least one student j ∈ S, it holds strictly. Once we prove this claim,
proof will be finished, since we know that ψA is group strategy-proof under acyclic priority
structures (Ergin (2002)).
For ease of notation, let µ0 = ψA(S,C, P,, q), µ1 = ψA(S ′, C, P ′,′, q), and µ2 =
ψA(S ′, C, P ′′,′, q).
First, from the well-known comparative statistics result (Gale and Sotomayor (1985)),
µ0iRiµ
1
i for all i ∈ S, which means µ0iR′iµ1i (since R′i = Ri for all i ∈ S). On the other hand,
by the definition of P ′′, µ0iR
′′
i ∅ for all i ∈ S. Therefore, R′′ i.r.m.t R′ at µ1. From Kojima and





i for all i ∈ S ′. Then, by the definition of P ′′, we have µ2iR′iµ1i for all i ∈ S ′.
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Next, by our starting supposition, we have µ1c ∩ S c µ0c . This implies that there exists
a student i ∈ S such that (i) i 6∈ µ0c and (ii) i ∈ µ1c ∩ Chc(c, qc, µ0c ∪ {i}). This along with
the stability of µ0 imply that µ0iPiµ
1



























i . Then, this implies that, given µ
2
k ∈ {c, ∅} for all
k ∈ S ′\S (by Condition (iv)), there exists a student j ∈ S, j 6= i, such that µ0i = µ2j , µ0j 6= µ2j
(these are due to the facts that, school µ0i has no excess capacity under µ
2 (otherwise, it can
not be stable) and µ0i 6= µ2i ), and j µ0i i (due to the stability of µ2). Moreover, since µ0 is
stable in the problem (S,C, P,, q), we have µ0jPjµ2j , which means µ0jP ′jµ2j .




j and student j, respectively,
that is, we consider the following sequence:
i→ µ0i → j → µ0j . (1)
Then, we have the following two cases:
Case 1. If µ0j = µ
2
i , then let µ
0
j point to student i. We, hence, end up with the following:
i→ µ0i → j → µ0j → i. (2)
The above situation is called “improvement cycle” in the literature in the sense that there
is a room for improving efficiency by letting students i, j trade their respective assignments
under µ2. Let denote the matching obtained by implementing this trade while keeping the
other students’ assignments unchanged by µ˜. Then, µ˜ Pareto dominates µ2 with respect to




i for all i ∈ S ′, µ˜ is also Pareto superior
to µ1 in the problem (S ′, C, P ′,′, q). This, however, contradicts the fact that ψA is efficient
under acyclic priority structures (Ergin (2002)).
Case 2.






Step 1. If µ0j 6= µ2i = c, then, since µ0jP ′jµ2j , by the same reasoning as before, there exists
a student k ∈ S, different than both i and j, such that µ0j = µ2k, µ0k 6= µ2k, and k µ0j j.






Now, let school µ0j and student k point to student k and school µ
0
k, respectively. Hence,
we end up with the following sequence:
i→ µ0i → j → µ0j → k → µ0k. (3)
Step 2. Similar to Case 1, if there exists a student in the above sequence who is matched
with µ0k under µ
2, let µ0k point to that student. Let say this student is j, then we have the
following:
i→ µ0i → j → µ0j → k → µ0k → j. (4)
In this case, we also end up with the improvement cycle consisting of students j, k and
schools µ0j , µ
0
k. If we denote the matching obtained by implementing this cycle while keeping
the other students’ assignments unchanged by µˆ, then µˆ Pareto dominates µ2 with respect to
preference profile P ′, which implies that it also dominates µ1 in the problem (S ′, C, P ′,′, q).
This, however, contradicts ψA being efficient under acyclic priority structures.
Step 3. If there exists no student in the sequence (3) who is matched with µ0k under
µ2, then this implies that µ0k 6= c (Since, otherwise, µ0k would point to student i, who is
matched with school c under µ2 by our supposition). Then, by the same reasoning as before,
there exists a student h ∈ S different than i, j, k such that µ0k = µ2h, µ0h 6= µ2h, and h µ0k k.
Moreover, since µ0 is stable in the problem (S,C, P,, q), µ0hPhµ2h, which means µ0hP ′hµ2h.
Now, let school µ0k and student h point to student h and school µ
0
h, respectively. We,
therefore, end up with the following sequence:
i→ µ0i → j → µ0j → k → µ0k → h→ µ0h. (5)
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Then, if we continue in the same way as before, since everything is finite, we will end up
with an improvement cycle. If we denote the matching obtained by implementing that cycle
while keeping the other students’ assignments unchanged by µ′, then µ′ Pareto dominates
µ2 with respect to P ′, which implies that it is also Pareto superior to µ1 in the problem
(S ′, C, P ′,′, q). This, however, contradicts the fact that ψA is efficient under acyclic priority
structures.










j for all j ∈ S ′. This, however, contradicts ψA
being group strategy-proof under acyclic priority structures (Ergin (2002)), which completes
the proof.
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